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Abstract
In recent research, outlier mining has been widely used in areas such as telecommunication, health care, ﬁnance and network
intrusion detection. By applying outlier mining in network anomaly detection, rarely occurring attacks can be identiﬁed. In this
paper we propose an outlier mining method based on symmetric neighborhood relationships. We evaluate the method with UCI ML
Repository datasets, benchmark dataset KDD Cup 1999 and real time intrusion datasets. The experimental results are compared
with existing approaches and performance is excellent.
c⃝ 2012 The Author Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the Department of Computer Science & Engineering, National Institute of
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1. Introduction
Outlier identiﬁcation refers to the problem of ﬁnding data points that are very different from the rest of the data
based on appropriate metrics. Such data points often contain useful information regarding unusual behavior of a
system described by the data. These anomalous data points are usually called outliers. Outlier detection has been used
widely in ﬁnding anomalous activity in telecommunication, detecting symptoms of new diseases and novel network
attack detection. Certain pieces of information are usually required by an outlier detection method to work. One such
piece of information is a labeled training dataset that is used with techniques from machine learning and statistical
learning theory (Smola & Vishwanathan 2010). An explicit predictive model is built based on the training dataset for
detection. The associated label with an instance of data refers to the data instance either as normal or intrusion class.
The outlier detection methods can be supervised or unsupervised based on the extent to which these labels are utilized
or available. Intrusion detection (ID) is a part of any security management system for computers and networks. An
intrusion detection system (IDS) gathers and analyzes information from various areas within a computer or a network
to identify possible security breaches, which include both types of intrusions: internal and external. A misuse intrusion
detection approach uses information about known attacks and detects intrusions based on matches with existing attack
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +91-03712-267007; fax: +91-03712-267006.
E-mail address: dkb@tezu.ernet.in
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
© 2012 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the Department of Computer 
Science & Engineering, National Institute of Technology Rourkela Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
240   Prasanta Gogoi et al. /  Procedia Technology  6 ( 2012 )  239 – 246 
patterns or signatures. On the other hand, an anomaly detection approach learns the normal behavior of the system or
the network it monitors and reports when the monitored behavior deviates signiﬁcantly from the normal proﬁle.
1.1. Outlier Detection in Anomaly Detection
Network anomaly detection (Gogoi, Borah & Bhattacharyya 2010) involves the collection of data relating to the
behavior of legitimate users over a period of time, and then applying tests to the gathered data to determine whether
that behavior is legitimate user behavior or not. Detection of abnormal behavior can be based on relevant features
extracted from network traces, packet or ﬂow data. An intrusion can be detected by ﬁnding an outlier whose features
are distinctly different from the rest of the data. In order to apply outlier detection to anomaly based network intrusion
detection, we assume (Chandola, Banerjee & Kumar 2009) the following: (i) The majority of the network connections
is normal trafﬁc. Only a small amount of trafﬁc is malicious and (ii) Attack trafﬁc is statistically different from normal
trafﬁc. However, in a real network scenario, these assumptions may not be always true. For example, in dealing with
bursty attack (Lazarevic, Ertoz, Kumar, Ozgur & Srivastava 2003) detection, the anomalous trafﬁc is actually more
frequent than the normal trafﬁc.
1.2. Contribution of the paper
In this paper, we introduce an effective method for outlier identiﬁcation using symmetric neighborhood relation-
ships (Jin, Tung, Han & Wang 2006), considering nearest neighbors as well as reverse of the nearest neighbors. We
present experimental results which show the ability to ﬁnd anomalies when detecting rare intrusion instances in the
KDD Cup 1999 dataset. Results from outlier detection using the method for various UCI ML Repository (Blake &
Merz 2001) datasets and our real life intrusion datasets TUIDS (Gogoi, Bhuyan, Bhattacharyya & Kalita 2012) are
also provided.
1.3. Organization of the Paper
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Background of outlier detection approaches and a classiﬁcation
of these approaches are presented in Section 2. In Section 3, we present the proposed method for outlier detection.
Experimental results and performance comparisons are provided in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper
and outlines possibilities for future work.
2. Background
Outlier detection searches for objects that do not obey rules and expectations valid for the major part of the data.
The detection of an outlier object may be evidence that there are new tendencies in the data. Although, outliers
are considered noise or error, they may have important information. The detection of outliers often depends on the
applied methods and hidden assumptions regarding data structures used. Depending on the approaches used in outlier
detection, the methodologies can be broadly classiﬁed (Gogoi, Bhattacharyya, Borah & Kalita 2011) as distance-
based, density-based and machine learning or soft computing based.
The distance-based methods for outlier detection are based on the computation of distances among objects in the
data with clear geometric interpretation. LOADED (Ghoting, Otey & Parthasarathy 2004) introduced a distance based
outlier detection method for mixed attribute data. Here, data points are considered linked if they are similar to each
other for each attribute pair. A density-based outlier detection method estimates the density of the neighborhood
of each data instance. An instance that lies in a neighborhood with low density is declared to be an outlier while
an instance that lies in a dense neighborhood is declared to be normal. (Breunig, Kriegel, Ng & Sander 2000)
computed a local outlier factor (LOF) for each object in the dataset. The outlier factor quantiﬁes outlyingness of an
object. (Koufakou & Georgiopoulos 2010) computed an anomaly score for each data point taking into consideration
the irregularity of the categorical values, the continuous values, and the relationship between the two spaces in the
dataset. Data points with similarity close to ‘0’ are more likely to be outliers. (Jin et al. 2006) focus on mining outliers,
called local outliers, that have density distribution signiﬁcantly different from their neighborhood.
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3. Proposed Method
Outliers in a dataset are the exceptional or rare objects which are far fewer in number in comparison to the rest of
the objects. An outlier detection method needs to ﬁnd these small groups of rare or exceptional objects in a dataset. We
introduce, an outlier detection method based on symmetric neighborhood relationships introduced by (Jin et al. 2006).
For each object of the dataset a forward neighbor outlier factor is estimated by ﬁnding the nearest neighbor set and
forward nearest neighbor set of the data objects to identify outliers.
Nearest Neighbor Set of k objects (NNk)
In a dataset D= {d1,d2, . . . ,dn} of n objects, let di and d j be two arbitrary objects in D. We use Euclidean distance to
evaluate the distance between objects di and d j, and denote it as dist(di,d j). However, dist is free from the restriction
of using any speciﬁc proximity measure.
Deﬁnition 1- The Nearest Neighbor Set of an object p of size k, (NNk(p)) is the set of k nearest neighbor objects of p
where k > 0. In a dataset D of ∣D∣ objects, ∣NNk(p)∣= k where
(a) if ∀p ∕∈ NNk(p), and
(b) dist(o, p)< dist(o´, p) where o and o´ are k-th and (k+1)-th nearest neighbors of p, respectively.
Forward Nearest Neighbor Set of k objects (FNNk)
Deﬁnition 2- The Forward Nearest Neighbor Set of object p of size k is the set of objects whose NNk contains object
p, denoted as FNNk(p). In a dataset D of ∣D∣ objects where p and q are arbitrary objects, FNNk(p) is deﬁned as
FNNk(p) = {q ∈ D ∣ p ∈ NNk(q), p ∕= q} . (1)
Forward Neighbor Outlier Factor of k objects (FNOFk)
A score for each object of the dataset is computed based on ∣NNk∣ and ∣FNNk∣ of the object. The score is termed the
Forward Neighbor Outlier Factor of k objects (FNOFk) and it decides the strength of linking the object with other
objects.
Deﬁnition 3- The Forward Neighbor Outlier Factor of k objects for an object p is the ratio of the remaining number
of objects of FNNk(p) of dataset D (except object p) to the number of dataset objects (except object p), denoted as
FNOFk(p). In a dataset D containing ∣D∣ objects, FNOFk(p) is deﬁned as
FNOFk(p) =
∣D∣− ∣FNNk(p)∣−1
∣D∣−1 = 1−
∣FNNk(p)∣
∣D∣−1 . (2)
Outlier Detection Algorithm
The outlier detection algorithm and two associated functions- getFNOFk(D,k) and getNNk(D, p,k) are given in
Algorithm 1. The algorithm has of two functions: getNNk() and getFNOF().
Complexity analysis
The outlier detection algorithm comprises of two functions: getNNkk() and getFNOFk(). The function getNNk()
performs distance computation among n objects and sorting of n object distances (we used Quicksort algorithm. So, it
is n log n). Thus the time complexity of this function is O(n+n log n). The function getFNOF() performs searches
among n× k objects, computation of outlier factor for n objects and searching of n objects for user deﬁned threshold
value. Thus the time complexity of this function is O(n× k× (n+ n log n)+ 2n). Hence, time complexity of the
outlier detection algorithm is O(n× k× (n+n log n)+2n), i.e., O(n2). We can reduce the complexity signiﬁcantly if
we use a spatial index structure (Guttman 1984).
4. Experimental Results
In this section, we perform a comprehensive experimental evaluation of the efﬁciency and the effectiveness of
our outlier detection method. All necessary experiments were carried out on an Intel workstation with Intel core 2
Quad @2.4GHz, 2 GB RAM, 160GB HDD. The programs were developed inC in a Linux environment. The method
is evaluated with various UCI ML Repository dataset (Blake & Merz 2001), a synthetic dataset, KDD Cup 1999
dataset (Hettich & Bay 1999) and our real time TUIDS (Gogoi et al. 2012) intrusion dataset.
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4.1. Dataset
The experiments are carried out with (i) UCI ML Repository datasets (ii) KDD Cup 1999 datasets and (iii) two real
time TUIDS intrusion datasets, Packet level and Flow level. The description of the datasets is given below.
Algorithm 1 Outlier Detection Algorithm
Input: Dataset D, Threshold M, Neighbor size k , Ob ject p;
Output: Outlier List L;
1: X = getFNOFk(D,k);
2: ∀t∈X
3: if t ≥M then
4: Add t to L;
5: end if
6: function getFNOFk(D,k)
7: while ∣D∣ ∕= Null do
8: ∀p∈D S= getNNk(D, p,k);
9: end while
10: ∀q∈S T = getNNK(D,q,k);
11: if p ∈ T then
12: Add q to list of FNNk(p);
13: ∣FNNk(p)∣= ∣FNNk(p)∣+1;
14: end if
15: Compute ∀p∈DFNOFk(p) =
{
1− ∣FNNk(p)∣∣D∣−1
}
;
16: Return FNOFk(p);
17: end function
18: function getNNk(D, p,k)
19: if ∣D∣ ∕= Null then
20: ∀p,q∈D;p ∕=q Compute dist(p,q);
21: end if
22: ∀p,q∈D Sort dist(p,q);
23: Add k shortest distant objects from p to NNk(p);
24: Return NNk(p);
25: end function
4.1.1. UCI ML Repository and Synthetic Dataset
The method was tested on several commonly used datasets from the UCI ML Repository dataset (Blake & Merz
2001). We used ten different datasets and a synthetic dataset for experimentation. The descriptions of datasets are
given in Table 2. The synthetic dataset is a 2-dimensional dataset we generated with different outlier cases. The other
datasets are abalone, breast cancer, diabetes, glass, heart, hepatitis, horse, ionosphere, and pima.
4.1.2. KDD Cup 1999 Dataset
The method was tested on datasets available in the KDD Cup 1999 intrusion detection benchmark datasets (Hettich
& Bay 1999). Each record of the datasets represents a connection between two network hosts according to network
protocols and is described by 41 attributes (38 continuous or discrete numerical attributes and 3 categorical attributes).
Each record is labeled as either normal or one speciﬁc kind of attack. Each dataset contains 22 types of attacks. The
attacks fall in one of the four categories: User to Root (U2R), Remote to local (R2L), Denial of Service (DoS) and
Probe. The numbers of samples of each category of attack in Corrected KDD dataset and 10 percent KDD dataset
are shown in Table 3.
4.1.3. TUIDS Intrusion Dataset
The method was also evaluated using our own real life TUIDS intrusion datasets generated at Tezpur Univer-
sity (Gogoi et al. 2012). There ar two datasets summarized in Table 4- Packet Level and Flow Level. Network trafﬁc
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corresponding to attack and normal were captured using our local network within a 4 week period. The attacks were
generated using attack tools (Mixter 2003) against a local network server. The produced trafﬁc was collected to obtain
the attack trafﬁc. 16 different types of attacks were generated. The attacks along with the corresponding tools for their
generation are given in Table 1. The network trafﬁc was captured at the packet level and the ﬂow level through two
separate port mirroring machines. The captured data was preprocessed and ﬁltered to extract various types of features.
The experimental setup of the testbed for network ﬂow capture includes one router, one L3 switch, two L2 switches,
one server, two workstations and forty nodes. Six VLANs are created from the L3 switch and L2 switch and nodes and
workstations are connected to separated VLANs. The L3 switch is connected to a router through an internal IP router
and the router is connected to the Internet through an external IP router. The server is connected to the L3 switch
through a mirror port to observe the trafﬁc activity to the switch. Another LAN of 350 nodes is connected to other
VLANs through ﬁve L3 and L2 switches and three routers. The attacks are launched within our testbed as well as
from another LAN through the Internet. In launching attacks within the testbed, nodes of one VLAN are attacked from
nodes of another VLAN and also the same VLAN. Normal trafﬁc is created within our testbed in restricted conditions
after disconnecting another LAN. The trafﬁc activities to our testbed are observed in the computer connected to the
mirror port. A diagram of the testbed is shown in Fig. 1.
Attack Generation
Tool
Attack Generation
Tool
bonk targa2.c 1234 targa2.c
jolt targa2.c saihyousen targa2.c
land targa2.c oshare targa2.c
nestea targa2.c window targa2.c
newtear targa2.c syn Nmap
syndrop targa2.c xmas Nmap
teardrop targa2.c f raggle f raggle.c
winnuke targa2.c smur f smur f4.c
Table 1: Attack List
Fig. 1: Testbed for generation of TUIDS intrusion
dataset
4.2. Performance Measures
Evaluation of performance of a clustering model is based on the counts of test records correctly and incorrectly
predicted by the model. These counts are tabulated in a table known as a confusion matrix. The terminologies used
in a confusion matrix are true positive (TP), false negative (FN), false positive (FP) and true negative (TN). The
counts in a confusion matrix can also be expressed in terms of percentages. True positive rate (TPR) is deﬁned as
the fraction of positive examples predicted correctly by the model, i.e., TPR = TP/(TP+FN). Similarly, the true
negative rate (TNR) is deﬁned as the fraction of negative examples predicted correctly by the model, i.e., TNR =
TN/(TN+FP). The false positive rate (FPR) is the fraction of negative examples predicted as positive class, i.e.,
FPR= FP/(TN+FP).
Detection Rate: The detection rate (DR) is deﬁned as the number of intrusion instances detected by the system
divided by the total number of intrusion instances present in the test dataset. In the confusion matrix, detection rate is
represented by TNR.
4.3. Selection of k and M thresh
We have analyzed the effect of neighborhood value k and threshold M thresh, using synthetic as well as real life
datasets (i.e., abalon, breast cancer, diabets and glass). The performance of the method in terms of DR largely depends
on the selection of k and M thresh, as seen in Figures 2-3. It is dependent on the dataset used for evaluation. However,
the most probable ranges of k and M thresh for these datasets are shown with vertically drawn dashed lines in the
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Fig. 2: k value determination
Fig. 3: M-thresh determination
Figures 2-3. In our experiments, better results are found with k values in the range of (0.20 - 0.40) and M thresh value
in the range of (0.92 - 0.95). Our experiments are evaluated with k = 30 and M thresh= 0.93.
4.4. Data preprocessing
The datasets contain categorical and numerical values. A dataset is preprocessed to convert it into an equivalent
numeric dataset. The values of the categorical attributes of a dataset are replaced with numeric values. The continuous
valued attributes of dataset are converted to discrete numbers by taking logarithm to the base 2 and then converting to
integer. This is done for each attribute value, z using the computation: if (z> 2) z = int (log2 (z)) + 1. Before taking
logarithm, the attributes which take fractional values in the range [0, 1] are multiplied by 100 so that they take values
in the range [0, 100]. Nominal valued attributes are mapped to discrete numeric codes. The class label attribute is
removed from the dataset and stored separately in a different ﬁle. The class labels are used for training and evaluating
the detection performance of the method.
4.5. Experimental Results
The results using UCI ML Repository datasets, KDDCup 1999 datasets and two real life TUIDS intrusion datasets
(Flow level and Packet level) are used to evaluate the performance of our method.
4.5.1. Results on UCI ML Repository Dataset
The method was evaluated using our own 2-dimensional synthetic dataset consisting of 2000 objects with 4%
outlier objects. The results of the synthetic dataset and other UCI Machine Repository datasets are given in terms of
detection rate (DR) and false positive rate (FPR) in Table 5. The results are compared with the results of other outlier
ﬁnding methods LOF (Breunig et al. 2000) and ORCA (Bay & Schwabacher 2003). Our method has produced better
result compared to the other methods. The comparison results is given in Table 5.
4.5.2. Results on KDD Cup 1999 Dataset
The method was evaluated usingCorrected KDD and 10 percent KDD of KDD Cup 1999 datasets. The objective
of the experiment was to determine how accurately the method can classify the rare categories of attack data, viz., R2L
and U2R. In high dimensional data, feature selection using mutual information (MI) is a widely accepted approach.
The list of relevant features of attacks in KDD Cup datasets is given in Table 7 is based on MI (Amini, Jalili &
Shahriari 2006). The relevant features are considered in outlier detection in KDD Cup datasets. The results using the
measures DR and FPR are given in Table 6.
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Table 2: Characteristics of Synthetic and UCI ML
Repository datasets
Sl No. Datasets Dimension Instances Classes Instances
of Outliers
1 Synthetic 2 2000 10 80
2 Abalone 8 4177 29 24
3 Breast cancer 10 699 2 39
4 Diabetes 8 768 2 43
5 Glass 10 214 6 9
6 Heart 13 270 2 26
7 Hepatitis 20 155 3 32
8 Horse 28 368 2 23
9 Ionosphere 34 351 3 59
10 Pima 8 768 2 15
Table 3: Attack distribution in KDD Cup datasets
Data sets DoS R2L U2R Probe Normal Total
Corrected KDD 229853 16347 70 4166 60593 311029
10-percent KDD 391458 1126 52 4107 97278 494021
Table 4: TUIDS Intrusion Dataset
Data sets DoS Probe Normal Total
Packet Level 151203 26839 254833 432875
Flow Level 162333 62741 175057 400131
Table 5: Experimental Results with Synthetic
and UCI ML Repository datasets
Datasets Measure LOF
(Breunig
et al.
2000)
ORCA
(Bay &
Schwabacher
2003)
Our
Method
Synthetic DR 0.7900 0.8400 1.0000FPR 0.0239 0.0186 0.0000
Abalone DR 0.8702 0.8591 1.0000FPR 0.0443 0.0480 0.0150
Breast Cancer DR 0.8543 0.8309 0.9621FPR 0.0377 0.0465 0.0349
Diabetes DR 0.6813 0.5945 0.8391FPR 0.0585 0.0458 0.0178
Glass DR 0.8713 0.8488 0.8826FPR 0.0360 0.0347 0.0149
Heart DR 0.9008 0.8869 0.9828FPR 0.0045 0.0207 0.0211
Hepatitis DR 0.8902 0.7621 0.9822FPR 0.0257 0.0399 0.0011
Horse DR 0.8112 0.8922 0.8705FPR 0.0299 0.0405 0.0119
Ionosphere DR 0.8208 0.8988 0.9783FPR 0.0377 0.0412 0.0208
Pima DR 0.9443 0.9141 1.0000FPR 0.0023 0.0221 0.0110
Table 6: Experimental Results with KDD Cup 1999 datasets
Dataset DR FPR
DoS R2L U2R Probe All Attacks
k=3 22.1 75.8 71.3 29.6 25.74 1.3
Corrected k=10 24.3 78.5 74.3 31.2 27.97 1.1
KDD k=20 32.1 89.0 84.3 39.8 35.96 0.9
k=30 31.33 55.21 81.12 35.16 32.97 1.03
k=3 26.3 81.8 73.4 34.6 26.54 1.2
10 percent k=10 27.3 75.8 82.3 27.50 48.0 1.5
KDD k=20 30.1 87.0 85.2 41.8 30.39 1.3
k=30 39.32 63.14 87.25 30.35 39.30 1.12
Table 7: Extracted Feature distribution in
KDD Cup datasets
Class Total
Feature
Selected Features
Normal 6 5,23,3,6,35,1
DoS 8 5,23,6,2,24,41,36,3
Probe 13 40,5,33,23,28,3,41,35,27,32,12,24,28
U2R 10 5,1,3,24,23,2,33,6,32,4,14,21
R2L 15 3,13,22,23,10,5,35,24,6,33,37,32,1,37,39
Table 8: Experimental Results with TUIDS
datasets
Dataset
DR
FPR
DoS Probe All Attacks
Packet Level 76.33 52.16 64.25 1.23
Packet Level 82.21 49.34 65.61 1.62
Table 9: Comparative results with Corrected KDD
Cup dataset
Elkan’s Zhiyi’s Our Method
DR for DoS 97.1% 25.1%-65.3% 22.1%-32.1%
DR for R2L 8.4% 20.9%-79.8% 55.1%-89.0%
DR forU2R 13.2% 27.6%-75.3% 71.3%-84.3%
DR for Probe 83.3% 31.6%-68.7% 29.6%-39.8%
DR for All attack 91.8% 48.8%-70.3% 25.74%-35.96%
FPR 0.5% 0.3%-0.4% 0.9%-1.3%
4.5.3. Results on TUIDS Intrusion Dataset
The method was also evaluated using our real life intrusion dataset TUIDS. Normal and speciﬁc attack data are
used as input to the outlier detection method. The identiﬁed outlier objects are considered as speciﬁc attacks. The
results using the measure DR and FPR are given in Table 8.
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4.6. Comparison of Results
The summarized results over the KDD Cup 1999 intrusion datasets show detection rate (DR) on intrusive records
and FPR over normal records. Performance evaluation results are compared with (Elkan 1999) Result and (Zhiyi &
Wenxiu 2007). The comparison results for the datasets are presented in Table 9. In performance comparison, our
method outperforms the other two methods in terms of DR for R2L andU2R attack categories.
5. Conclusion
An efﬁcient outlier detection method is presented based on (Jin et al. 2006) for multidimensional datasets with an
application to network anomaly detection. The proposed method is evaluated with various datasets including UCI ML
Repository dataset, KDD Cup 1999 bench mark dataset and real time network datasets called TUIDS. The detection
performance of the method is good and better than similar methods.
An ensemble approach using different supervised and unsupervised methods of network anomaly detection is under
development. The outlier detection method will be included as constituent to the ensemble approach.
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